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The United States has projected Army forces abroad on a grand scale since World War I.
The enormous launch of US heavy forces to European and Pacific theaters in World War II, and later large scale, extended deployments to Korea and Vietnam, have relied primarily upon sealift.
However, throughout the Cold War period, a growing threat and continuing evolution of modern warfighting demanded an ever shorter response time for US light and heavy forces.
Our Cold War National Security Strategy relied principally upon forward basing of troops, Strategy has ascended, as our forward presence in potential theaters overseas has diminished. We recognize that the timely arrival of main and reserve forces is crucial to what happens afterward.
But the time available in future conflicts may pre-empt ship-borne build-up. The conflict intensity might as well, making transport ships and commercial aircraft vulnerable targets of high value to the enemy. The threat of more than one Major Regional Conflict (MRC) magnifies the problem.
The Army's very relevance may well depend upon a vast increase in strategic military airlift, both for initial entry and follow-on theater logistical support. Fortunately, the United States Air Force (USAF) identified the required operational capabilities of the C-17 in the 1970s as the means for future force projection. It's one of few major systems that can really provide strategic means to political ends.
Materiel acquisition is the business of providing warfighting capabilities to our forces.
Accomplishing the development and procurement of a major system "new start" (a ground-up design of an aircraft to military specifications) entails many complex processes involving key players of Clausewitz's Trinity (the people, its military, and their government).
OVERVIEW
What follows is a discussion of the C-17 Globemaster acquisition program, analyzing the critical programmatic (technical performance, cost and schedule and political) obstacles encountered in this major system development, deriving the management lessons learned, and recommendations for their prevention in the future. The C-17 story unfolds as a tragic investment failure and emerges a flag-bearer for acquisition reform. As the reader will see, the strategic needs for this transport aircraft, after a long saga, were eventually transformed into a long-term U.S.
capability in a world with increasing propensity for regional conflicts. But the campaign to win this prize was long and hard-fought.
BACKGROUND -CURRENT AND NEEDED LIFT CAPABELITIES
The current airlift aircraft in the USAF inventory include the C-5, C-141 and C-130. Each performs different specific missions. A capabilities matrix is shown below.
The current legacy airlift fleet is becoming old. The average age today of the C-141B is twenty-nine years; the C-5A's average age is twenty-three years, and the C-5B's is seven years. 2 To the frustration of mobilization planners in the 1980s, it seemed the Department of Defense (DOD) priority for procurement of weapon systems was typified by the purchase of "killing systems" over logistical needs, however critical. The Air Force wanted to augment and boost its lift capacity with a flexible capability to accomplish multiple missions with one airframe. It would be able to land on short runways, like the C-130, but carry more payload than the C-141 and even carry "outsized" loads like the C-5.
The C-17 transport is today a four engine aircraft designed to carry a payload of 130,000 pounds for a distance of 5,200 nautical miles without aerial refueling, and is designed to carry Army combat units to small, sparsely furnished airstrips at trouble spots around the world.
3 Similar
• to the C-5 Galaxy, it has a huge cargo belly that can carry outsize items, such as M-l tanks, Apache helicopters, Patriot anti-aircraft/missile batteries and Bradley armored troop carriers, which are too bulky for most other cargo planes. In contrast to commercial wide-body jets, the C-17 and C-5 have a low-slung fuselage from which vehicles can quickly be driven on and off. The C-17 is smaller than the C-5 and is more agile on the ground. A fleet of C-17s can thus deliver more cargo faster and closer to the action, making use of runways too short to accommodate the C-5.
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THE ACQUISITION PROGRAM -ANALYSIS OF A TURNAROUND
Schedule delays, technical problems, and cost overruns have become particularly critical circumstances in the 1990s era of shrinking DOD budgets. The C-17 acquisition program, however, has survived for sixteen years (and is now thriving) despite a myriad of cost, operational performance and schedule problems which plagued it. Major issues along the way included ninety-one percent of 900 structural mechanics assigned to the C-l 7 in the first year of production had a significant lack of experience, resulting in forty percent rework rates, adding four percent to the cost of each aircraft. 8 Under severe pressure to reverse its declining profit margins, McDonnell Douglas was greatly relieved by the Air Force's "rushed" approval of a contracting milestone which authorized "assembly complete" status for its T-l (first test flight) aircraft. This softened the contractor's financial crunch and eliminated more than $1.6 billion in test liabilities before the end of FY1990.
The Air Force later refuted any charge of ethical impropriety for relieving McDonnell Douglas's financial burdens, asserting that this was "perfectly appropriate" because neither law, regulations or sound management principles were violated. 9 However, during the same period, the Air Force had to investigate an estimate that the cost of the C-l 7 development contract, which included the first six production aircraft, would incur a cost overrun of over $300 million (to $7.75 billion) and that the total cost of the 120-aircraft target procurement program would overrun by $2-$3 billion beyond the $35.8 billion current estimate. McDonnell Douglas was presumably liable for development costs beyond the development (fixed price) contract ceiling price of $6.6 billion.
Auditors criticized that the "T-l assembly complete" decision was among a sequence of moves intended to speed up C-17 payments to McDonnell Douglas and was a public relations gimmick to create improper vision of success.
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In another negative episode, C-17 test planes were required to fly with "interim restrictions" on control surface loads after Grumman Corporation, the subcontractor for the plane's control surfaces, located flaws in ailerons and elevators. These deficiencies could have potentially reduced the aircraft's durability and strength, with major safety implications. 11 Furthermore, the majority of the C-17's flight controls rely on computer systems. 12 Looking back, the GAO in 1993 criticized the Air Force for disregarding Pentagon software development guidelines, giving
McDonnell Douglas too much leverage in software development, and allowing a proliferation of computer languages (six) in C-17 software, including three languages alone in the flight control computer.
The C-17 contains fifty-seven subsystems requiring 970,000 lines of software code. The
Mission Computer, considered to be the "center" of the C-17's avionics, posed a significant technical challenge. This system was too slow and wasn't meeting capacity requirements. Both the Air Force and the contractor agreed that this system was inadequate. 13 "The Air Force assumed that software was a low-risk part of the C-17 program and did little to either manage its development or to oversee the contractor's performance. McDonnell Douglas took a number of shortcuts that have substantially increased the risk of not successfully completing software development and testing and may result in substantially higher software maintenance costs when the C-17 is eventually fielded." In January 1994, the Pentagon also compromised on a slight reduction in the original range and payload requirements and agreed to buy a total of fourteen C-17s in fiscal years 1995 and 1996 to bring the total number of operational planes to forty. DOD said it would decide on how many more transports to budget for based on McDonnell Douglas's success in meeting future cost, performance and schedule parameters. The Air Force and McDonnell Douglas were seeking more quantities in future production, with the Air Force needing seventy-to-eighty planes for a viable fleet and
McDonnell Douglas asserting it must sell eighty-to-one hundred transports to break even. The upcoming November, 1994 DAB decision would be critical to both sides' needs.
Meanwhile, McDonnell Douglas and DOD tackled affordability hurdles by instituting costevaluation teams to consider further cost-reduction techniques in systems engineering. McDonnell Douglas reported that a ten percent reduction was achieved through direct labor pools and better building maintenance and scheduling.
The GAO sharply criticized the C-17 program, deeming further production to be cost adverse, and fueled additional attacks from Congress, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Rand Corporation. "The C-17 program has been a troubled program almost since its inception and has fallen far short of original cost, schedule and performance expectations. Total program costs continue to grow." 19 It also found that the average target unit price the government negotiated with McDonnell Douglas rose by $33 million per aircraft between production lots three and five.
Meanwhile, delivery schedules continued to fall behind and production aircraft No.7 through 10
were delivered with increasing degrees of unfinished work or known deficiencies.
GAO charged that the Air Force waived potential claims against McDonnell Douglas
without quantifying those claims and conducted a "blanket resolvement" of filed and un-filed contractor claims by adding $237 million to the contract price. GAO said DOD never established specific cost and schedule criteria in the settlement, merely requiring McDonnell Douglas to demonstrate "ability" to deliver aircraft on schedule and at cost. Examining McDonnell Douglas, GAO stated that the contractor's "out-of-pocket" costs were really $46 million for the settlement, not $454 million as claimed, and questioned the validity of $1.25 billion in potential delays and disruptions. In addition, GAO believed that $171 million for non-recurring engineering should be excluded, because full-scale engineering and development costs had been allocated improperly by the contractor to current and future production contracts. The report emphasized that unsettled claims and late delivery of aircraft were major hindrances to the program's survival. GAO also charged that contract specifications were relaxed on payload weight and fuel consumption rates at the expense of originally-specified airlift capability. Of course, the counter argument is that there are problems with accepting commercial aircraft with significantly less capability in the military theater, opposing any justification for halting C-17 production. Much more versatile, the C-17 can carry "outsized" cargo, including an M-l Tank or Apache helicopter, making it a much more effective transport vehicle in wartime. In addition, the C-17 is built to better survive military use, and has superior maneuverability, enemy detection and evasion capability. Furthermore, the C-17 is built for severe environments that do not require long runways and special equipment for loading and unloading. In light of the Administration's objective to deploy sufficient forces to successfully wage two major regional conflicts at once, freight capacity limitations at major international airports would severely hamper national interest and security, if commercial transport were utilized. 23 Finally, total force airlift capabilities would likely drop below standards from the commercial buy, mainly due to significant maintenance problems with the older C-141 workhorses. This would likely necessitate the purchase of additional C-17s before the year 2000, reducing the savings envisioned by CBO. The airlift fleet is comprised of aging legacy aircraft, making it even more critical to fully integrate a C-17 fleet which could perform to the requirements of each other aircraft type.
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THE TURNAROUND
The rest of 1994 was tumultuous as other critical issues continued to threaten the life of the program, despite renewed government-contractor cooperation, mechanical refinements, and "concurrent engineering" and quality advances. They included the nagging software incompatibilities, unresolved cost excesses, the alleged life-cycle cost advantage of the procuring NDAA aircraft, and a growing alignment of negative public opinion fueled by Congress, a Rand study and the residual effects of the GAO Report. Intense competition between parties with vested interests in the future of the program, including Congress, GAO, Rand Corporation, the Services, DOD, Pentagon insiders, contractors, and NDAA supporters, was giving the C-17 highest visibility. The long-awaited C-17 is now rolling off the production line in some significant numbers (26 deliveries thus far, and Congress recently approved an unprecedented multi-year contract for 80 more over the next 10 years). A total buy of 120 is planned.
OBSERVATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
The C-17 was born from an Air Force want, derived of course from anticipated airlift needs. In the late 1970s, the Air Force sought to improve air transport. They wanted an aircraft that could carry "outsized" loads. The fairly new (at the time) C-5 had this capability but required runways over 3,000 feet long. The aircraft that the Air Force sought to fulfill this requirement was called the C-X, and eventually became the C-17 Globemaster.
From its beginning in 1981, the C-17 was in development longer than any plane in history and also has the distinction of being the world's third most expensive aircraft, behind the B-2 Stealth Bomber and the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). As the development of the C-17 dragged on through the entire decade of the 1980s, the world around this project changed dramatically. A "new world order" of fewer US bases and an aging legacy air transport fleet transformed the operational requirements of the C-17 from an individual service requirement into a truly joint service need: versatile strategic force projection.
Lessons learned from this difficult and controversial program are: contract types (in this case Firm Fixed Price for research & development) don't necessarily alleviate government cost risk; American business has limited funds to invest on programs without government support; a like limit exists on commercial manpower; real economies can be gained in development when bureaucracy is removed from contract scope of work; and that, while all DOD programs must compete for priority and resources in the planning, programming and budgeting process, at least once in a while, overwhelming user need can outweigh affordability despite a severely declining defense budget.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The US government must select and maintain a long term acquisition strategy for military capabilities. The C-17 actually benefited from the major political and funding changes that happened during the development, since our global military strategy evolved to actually heighten the need for the C-17.
Strategies that have been adopted by a service and properly presented to the public and Congress should be properly funded. The C-17 program suffered for several years as a good idea without funding, and lack of initial funds rippled into and exacerbated problems in other areas, including staffing at McDonnell Douglas and management from the Project Manager.
The US government must maintain its rigorous contracting process for major acquisitions, including careful requirement determination, procurement request, solicitation, selection, etc. However, once the contract has been awarded, the contractor must be allowed to do his job with minimal interference. The C-17 program was severely hampered by management control systems imposed by the Air Force, including detailed breakdowns on spending for comparisons to cost targets and other expensive micro-managing tools that added apparently little value to the product.
The first C-17s produced have rendered highly successful service to the Bosnian peacekeeping mission as the world watched, and future production is virtually assured by the unprecedented multi-year contract to purchase eight C-17s per year for the next ten years. 39 The total purchase quantity and deployment of C-17s does not necessarily guarantee enough strategic airlift for the timely arrival of all US forces to two nearly simultaneous Major Regional
Conflicts. However, the C-17's arrival into the aging and retiring airlift fleet is timely indeed.
